Fiscal consolidation in an open economy with sovereign premia and without monetary policy independence by Philippopoulos, Apostolis et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Fiscal consolidation in an open economy
with sovereign premia and without
monetary policy independence
Apostolis Philippopoulos and Petros Varthalitis and
Vanghelis Vassilatos
Athens University of Economics and Business, Economic and Social
Research Institute; Trinity College Dublin, Athens University of
Economics and Business
2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/81327/
MPRA Paper No. 81327, posted 15 September 2017 09:10 UTC
Fiscal consolidation in an open economy with
sovereign premia and without monetary policy
independence
Apostolis Philippopoulos y
(Athens University of Economics and Business, and CESifo)
Petros Varthalitis
(University of Glasgow)
Vanghelis Vassilatos
(Athens University of Economics and Business)
September 10, 2016
Abstract
We welfare rank various tax-spending-debt policies in a New Keynesian model of a
small open economy featuring sovereign interest-rate premia and loss of monetary policy
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(a) Debt consolidation comes at a short-term pain but the medium- and long-term gains
can be substantial. (b) In the early phase of pain, the best scal policy mix is to cut public
consumption spending to address the debt problem, and, at the same time, to cut income
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1 Introduction
Since the global crisis in 2008, and after years of decits and rising debt levels, public nances
have been at the center of attention in most eurozone periphery countries. Although several
policy proposals are under discussion, a particularly debated one is public debt consolidation.1
Proponents claim this is for good reason: as a result of high and rising public debt, borrowing
costs have increased, causing crowding out problems and undermining government solvency.
Opponents, on the other hand, claim that debt consolidation worsens the economic downturn
and leads to a vicious cycle at least in the short term. At the same time, as members of the
single currency, these countries cannot use an independent monetary policy.
What is the best use of scal policy under these circumstances? Is debt consolidation
benecial? Should the debt ratio be stabilized at its currently historically high level or should
it be brought down? If brought down, how quickly? Do the answers to these questions depend
on which tax-spending policy instruments are used over time?
This paper welfare ranks various scal policies in light of the above. The setup is a rather
conventional New Keynesian model of a small open economy, where the interest rate, at which
the country borrows from the world capital market, increases with the public debt-to-GDP
ratio.2 We focus on a monetary policy regime in which the small open economy xes the
exchange rate and loses monetary policy independence; this mimics membership in a currency
union. Hence, the key national macroeconomic tool left is scal policy.
Then, following a rule-like approach to policy, we assume that scal policy is conducted via
simple and implementable feedback policy rules. In particular, we assume that public spending
and the tax rates on consumption, capital and labor are all allowed to respond to the inherited
public debt-to-GDP ratio, as well as to contemporaneous output, as deviations from policy
targets.3 We experiment with various policy target values depending on whether policymakers
1We will use the terms debt consolidation, scal adjustment and scal austerity interchangeably. For a
discussion of the tradeo¤s faced by policymakers in the case of scal adjustment, see e.g. the EEAG Report on
the European Economy (2014).
2For empirical support of this assumption, see e.g. European Commission (2012). For the small open economy
model and various deviations from it, see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003). Further details and extensions are
below.
3For empirical support of such rules, see e.g. European Commission (2011). There is a rich literature on
monetary and scal feedback policy rules that includes e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005 and 2007), Pappa
and Vassilatos (2007), Kirsanova et al. (2007), Leith and Wren-Lewis (2008), Batini et al. (2008), Kirsanova et
al. (2009), Leeper et al. (2009), Bi (2010), Bi and Kumhof (2011), Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2012), Cantore
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aim just to stabilize the economy around its status quo, or whether they also want to move the
economy to a new reformed steady state. The status quo is naturally dened as the solution
consistent with the euro period data. The new reformed steady state, on the other hand, is
dened as the case in which the scal authorities ajdust their policies as much as needed so as
to end up with lower debt and zero sovereign interest-rate premia; we also consider the case in
which the new reformed steady state is the associated Ramsey steady state. In addition, since
we do not want our results to be driven by ad hoc di¤erences in feedback policy coe¢ cients
across di¤erent policy rules, we focus on optimized ones. In other words, we compute simple
and implementable policy rules that also maximize householdswelfare. In particular, adopting
the methodology of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a, 2005 and 2007), we compute welfare-
maximizing rules by taking a second-order approximation to both the equilbrium conditions
and the welfare criterion around the new reformed steady state(s).
The model is solved numerically using common parameter values and scal-public nance
data from the Italian economy during 2001-2013. We choose Italy simply because it exhibits
most of the features discussed in the opening paragraph above and, at the same time, it
continues to participate in the world capital market without receiving foreign aid like other
eurozone periphery countries. It thus looks as a natural choice to quantify our model.
Before presenting our results, it is worth pointing out that there is no such a thing like
"the" debt consolidation: the implications of debt consolidation depend heavily on which policy
instrument bears the cost in the early phase of austerity and on which policy instrument is
anticipated to reap the benet in the late phase, once the debt burden has been reduced and
scal space has been created.4 The costs in the early phase are due to spending cuts and/or tax
increases, while the opposite holds once scal space has been created. Our results (see below)
conrm all this. Hence, the choice of scal policy instruments matters for lifetime utility and
output. This choice also matters for how quickly public debt should be brought down: the
more distorting are the scal policy instruments used during the early costly phase, the slower
the speed of scal adjustment should be. Naturally, there is more choice when we allow for
et al. (2012), Herz and Hohberger (2013), Kliem and Kriwoluzky (2014) and Philippopoulos et al. (2015).
4 In other words, the debate about the benets and costs of each instrument used for debt consolidation is
essentially a debate about the size of the multiplier of each instrument (see the discussion in the EEAG Report
on the European Economy, 2014). See also e.g. Coenen et al. (2008), Leeper et al. (2009) and Davig and
Leeper (2011) on how the impact of current policy depends on expectations of possible future policy regimes.
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policy mixes (for instance, when the policy instrument(s) used in the early costly phase can
be di¤erent from those used in the late phase of scal space) than when we are restricted to
use a single instrument all the time.
Our main results are as follows. First, in most cases, debt consolidation is benecial only
if we are relatively far-sighted. For instance, in our baseline computations, debt consolidation
is welfare-improving only after the rst ten years. In other words, debt consolidation comes at
a short-term loss (this loss is bigger if one uses one scal instrument only, instead of a scal
policy mix). Nevertheless, once the short-term pain is over, the gains from debt consolidation
get substantial over time. All this means that the argument for, or against, debt consolidation
involves a value judgment. On the other hand, we nd that debt consolidation is welfare-
improving all the time, even in the short term, when we travel to the Ramsey steady state;
but, in that steady state, the (optimal) values of the tax rates are far away from their values
in the actual data.
Second, under debt consolidation, a general result is that the scal authorities should use all
available tax-spending instruments during the early costly phase of scal austerity and reduce
capital tax rates - which are particularly distorting - during the late phase of scal space.
Actually, the anticipation of a reduction in capital taxes plays a key role in the recovery from
scal austerity. During the early costly phase, the assignment of instruments to intermediate
targets (or economic indicators) should be as follows: cut public consumption spending to
address the public debt problem, while, at the same time, reduce income (capital and labor)
tax rates in order to mitigate the recessionary e¤ects of austerity. Sometimes, consumption
tax rates should be also used, if changes in other taxes are restricted. The bottom line is that
the choice of the scal policy mix is important (as also argued by Wren-Lewis, 2010) and that
the short-term cost becomes too big if the scal authorities pay attention to debt imbalances
only.
Third, when we solve the model in the ctional case in which Italy would have followed
an independent monetary policy (meaning that now there is also a feeback Taylor-type rule
for the nominal interest rate), the main results do not change. Also, to the extent that the
feedback policy coe¢ cients, both in scal and monetary policy rules, are selected optimally,
the welfare gain from switching to exible exchange rates appears to be negligible, at least in
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this class of New Keynesian models.
What is the value added of our paper? Papers on scal consolidation in an open economy,
which are close to ours, include Coenen et al. (2008), Forni et al. (2010a, 2010b), Cogan
et al. (2013), Erceg and Lindé (2013), Almeida et al. (2013) and Roeger and in t Veld
(2013).5 But these papers a priori set the scal instruments through which debt consolidation
is implemented or the speed/pace of this adjustment. Our work di¤ers mainly because: (i)
Following an optimized feedback rule-like approach to policy, we search for the best mix of
scal action in an open economy facing sovereign interest-rate premia and loss of monetary
policy independence. In doing this, we put special emphasis on which instruments should bear
the cost of consolidation in the early phase and which instruments should reap the benets in
the later phase. (iii) We study transition results depending on whether the government simply
stabilizes the economy from exogenous shocks, or it also leads the economy to a new reformed
steady state with lower debt. (iii) We study what would have happened with monetary policy
independence other things equal.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
presents the data, parameterization and the status quo solution. Section 4 discusses how we
work. The main results are in Section 5. A rich sensitivity analysis is in Section 6. Section
7 studies the case with independent monetary policy. Section 8 closes the paper. Algebraic
details and additional robustness results are in an online Appendix.6
2 Model
Consider a small open economy where the interest-rate premium is debt-elastic (see e.g.
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2003). On other dimensions, our setup is the standard New Key-
nesian model of an open economy with domestic and imported goods featuring imperfect
competition and Calvo-type price rigidities (see e.g. Galí and Monacelli, 2005 and 2008, and
Benigno and Thoenissen, 2008).
The economy is composed of N identical households indexed by i = 1; 2; :::; N , of N rms
5Papers on debt consolidation in a closed economy include Cantore et al. (2012), Bi et al. (2013), Pappa et
al. (2014) and Philippopoulos et al. (2015). Econometric studies on the e¤ects of debt consolidation include
e.g. Perotti (1996), Alesina et al. (2012) and Batini et al. (2012).
6The Appendix is also available at http://www.aueb.gr/users/aphil/files/appendix_to_SOE_paper_
IJCB.pdf
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indexed by h = 1; 2; :::; N , each one of them producing a di¤erentiated domestically produced
tradable good, as well as of monetary and scal authorities. Similarly, there are f = 1; 2; :::; N
di¤erentiated imported goods produced abroad. Domestic rms and owned by domestic house-
holds and any prots are equally divided to these households. Population, N , is constant over
time.
2.1 Aggregation and prices
2.1.1 Consumption bundles
The quantity of variety h produced by domestic rm h and consumed by domestic household i
is denoted as cHi;t(h). Using a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, the composite domestic good consumed
by household i, cHi;t, consists of h varieties and is given by the function:
7
cHi;t =

NP
h=1
[cHi;t(h)]
 1

 
 1
(1)
where  > 0 is the elasticity of substitution across goods produced in the domestic country
and   1=N is a weight used to avoid scale e¤ects in equilibrium.
Similarly, the quantity of imported variety f produced abroad by foreign rm f and con-
sumed by domestic household i is denoted as cFi;t(f). Using a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, the
composite imported good consumed by household i, cFi;t, consists of f varieties and is given by
the function:
cFi;t =
"
NP
f=1
[cFi;t(f)]
 1

# 
 1
(2)
In turn, household is consumption bundle, ci;t, is dened as:
ci;t =

cHi;t
 
cFi;t
1 
(1  )1  (3)
where  is the degree of preference for domestic goods (if  > 1=2, there is a home bias).
7As in e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), we work with summations rather than with integrals. This does
not a¤ect the results.
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2.1.2 Consumption expenditure, prices and terms of trade
Household is total consumption expenditure is:
Ptci;t = P
H
t c
H
i;t + P
F
t c
F
i;t (4)
where Pt is the consumer price index (CPI), PHt is the price index of home tradables, and P
F
t
is the price index of foreign tradables (expressed in domestic currency).
In turn, is expenditures on home and foreign goods are respectively:
PHt c
H
i;t =
NP
h=1
PHt (h)c
H
i;t(h) (5)
PFt c
F
i;t =
NP
f=1
PFt (f)c
F
i;t(f) (6)
where PHt (h) is the price of variety h produced at home and P
F
t (f) is the price of variety f
produced abroad, both denominated in domestic currency.
We assume that the law of one price holds meaning that each tradable good sells at the same
price at home and abroad. Thus, PFt (f) = StP
H
t (f), where St is the nominal exchange rate
(where an increase in St implies a depreciation) and PHt (f) is the price of variety f produced
abroad denominated in foreign currency. A star denotes the counterpart of a variable or a
parameter in the rest-of-the world. Note that the terms of trade are dened as P
F
t
PHt
(=
StPHt
PHt
),
while the real exchange rate is dened as StP

t
Pt
.
2.2 Households
Each household i acts competitively to maximize expected discounted lifetime utility:
E0
1X
t=0
tU (ci;t; ni;t; gt) (7)
where ci;t is is consumption bundle as dened above, ni;t is is hours of work, gt is per capita
public spending, 0 <  < 1 is the time preference rate, and E0 is the rational expectations
operator.
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The period utility function is assumed to be of the form:8
ui;t (ci;t; ni;t; gt) =
c1 i;t
1     n
n1+i;t
1 + 
+ g
g1 t
1   (8)
where n; g; , ,  are standard preference parameters. That is, 1= is the elasticity of
intertemporal subsititution and  is the inverse of Frisch labour elasticity.
The period budget constraint of household i written in real terms is (notice that, for
simplicity, we assume a cashless economy; we report that our results do not depend on this):
(1 +  ct)

PHt
Pt
cHi;t +
PFt
Pt
cFi;t

+
PHt
Pt
xi;t + bi;t +
StP

t
Pt
fhi;t +
h
2

StP

t
Pt
fhi;t  
SP 
P
fhi
2
=
=

1  kt

rkt
PHt
Pt
ki;t 1 + e!i;t+ (1  nt )wtni;t +Rt 1Pt 1Pt bi;t 1 +
+Qt 1
StP

t
Pt
P t 1
P t
fhi;t 1    li;t (9)
where xi;t is is domestic investment, bi;t is the real value of is end-of-period domestic govern-
ment bonds, fhi;t is the real value of is end-of-period internationally traded assets denominated
in foreign currency (if negative, it denotes foreign private debt), rkt denotes the real return to
the beginning-of-period domestic capital, ki;t 1, e!i;t is is real dividends received by domestic
rms, wt is the real wage rate, Rt 1  1 denotes the gross nominal return to domestic govern-
ment bonds between t   1 and t, Qt 1  1 denotes the gross nominal return to international
assets between t   1 and t;  li;t denotes real lump-sum taxes to each household (if negative,
it denotes transfers), and 0   ct ; kt ; nt  1 are tax rates on consumption, capital income
and labour income respectively. Small letters denote real values, e.g. bi;t  Bi;tPt ; fhi;t 
Fhi;t
P t
;
wt  WtPt ; e!i;t  e
i;tPt ;  li;t  T li;tPt , and capital letters denote nominal values. Also, letters with-
out time subscripts denote steady state values. The parameter h  0 measures adjustment
costs related to private foreign assets as a deviation from their steady state value, fhi ; these
adjustment costs help us to avoid excess volatility and get plausible (in line with the data)
short-term dynamics for private foreign assets following a policy reform; further details are in
subsection 3.1 below.
8See also Galí (2008), Galí and Monacelli (2008) and many others in this literature.
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The law of motion of physical capital for each household i is:
ki;t = (1  )ki;t 1 + xi;t   
2

ki;t
ki;t 1
  1
2
ki;t 1 (10)
where 0 <  < 1 is the depreciation rate of capital and   0 is a parameter capturing
adjustment costs related to physical capital.
Details on the households problem and the rst-order conditions are in Appendix A.
2.3 Firms
Each rm h produces a di¤erentiated good of variety h enjoying market power on its own good
and facing Calvo-type price xities.
The nominal prot of rm h is (see also e.g. Benigno and Thoenissen, 2008):
e
t(h) = PHt (h)yHt (h)  rkt PHt (h)kt 1(h) Wtnt(h) (11)
All rms use the same technology as represented by the production function:
yHt (h) = At[kt 1(h)]
[nt(h)]
1  (12)
where At is an exogenous stochastic TFP process whose motion is dened below and 0 <  < 1.
Prot maximization by rm h is subject to the demand for its product (see Appendix B):
yHt (h) = c
H
t (h) + xt(h) + gt (h) + c
F
t (h) =

PHt (h)
PHt
 
yHt (13)
so that, demand for rm hs product, yHt (h), comes from domestic households consump-
tion and investment, cHt (h) and xt(h) respectively where c
H
t (h) =
PN
i=1 c
H
i;t(h) and xt(h) =PN
i=1 xi;t(h), from the domestic government, gt (h) =
h
PHt (h)
PHt
i 
gt, and from foreign house-
holdsconsumption, cFt (h) =
PN
i=1 c
F
i;t (h).
In addition, rms are subject to a Calvo-type pricing mechanism. In particular, in each
period, each rm h faces an exogenous probability  of not being able to reset its price. A rm
h, which is able to reset its price at time t, chooses its price P#t (h) to maximize the sum of
discounted expected nominal prots for the next k periods in which it may have to keep its
9
price xed. This objective is dened as:
Et
1X
k=0
kt;t+ke
t+k (h) = Et 1X
k=0
kt;t+k
n
P#t (h) y
H
t+k (h) 	t+k
 
yHt+k (h)
o
where t;t+k is a discount factor taken as given by the rm (but it equals the households in-
tertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption, in equilibrium), yHt+k (h) =

P#t (h)
PHt+k
 
yHt+k
and 	t(:) is the minimum nominal cost function for producing yHt (h) at t so that 	
0
t(:) is the
associated nominal marginal cost.
Details on the rms problem and the rst-order conditions are in Appendix B.
2.4 Government budget constraint
The period budget constraint of the government in real terms is (details are in Appendix C):
dt = Rt 1
Pt 1
Pt
t 1dt 1 +Qt 1
StP t
Pt
P t 1
P t
Pt 1
P t 1St 1
(1  t 1) dt 1 + P
H
t
Pt
gt 
  ct(P
H
t
Pt
cHt +
PFt
Pt
cFt )  kt (rkt P
H
t
Pt
kt 1 + e!t)  nt wtnt    lt + g2 [(1  t) dt   (1  ) d]2
(14)
where dt  DtPt is the real value end-of-period total public debt. As said, small letters denote
real values, e.g. dt  DtPt : Total public debt, Dt, can be held by domestic private agents, tDt;
as well as by foreign private agents, (1  t)Dt; where the fraction 0  t  1 is exogenously
given.9 The parameter g  0 measures adjustment costs related to public foreign debt and
are similar to those of the household in equation (9) above (further details are in subsection
3.1 below).
In each period, one of ( ct , 
k
t , 
n
t , gt; 
l
t; t; dt) needs to adjust to satisfy the government
budget constraint (see subsection 2.7 below).
9Public debt di¤ers from foreign debt. The end-of-period public debt, written in nominal terms, is Dt =
Bt + StF
g
t , where Bt = tDt =
PN
i=1Bi;t, is domestic government bonds held by domestic agents and StF
g
t =
(1  t)Dt denotes domestic government bolds held by foreign investors. On the other hand, the countrys end-
of-period net foreign debt, written in nominal terms, is St(F
g
t  Fht ) = (1  t)Dt StFht , where Fht =
PN
i=1 F
h
i;t
is foreign assets held by domestic agents (if negative, it denotes liabilities). As said, further details are in
Appendix C. Note that, by focusing on a single open economy, we do not model the behavior of foreign investors,
so that we treat 0  t  1 as exogenous.
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2.5 Closing the model: debt-elastic interest rate premium
As is well known, to avoid nonstationarity and convergence to a well-dened steady state, we
have to depart from the benchmark small open economy model (see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe,
2003, for alternative ways). Here, we do so by endogenizing the interest rate faced by the
domestic country when it borrows from the world capital market, Qt.10 In particular, we start
by assuming that the country premium between t and t+ 1, namely Qt  Qt , is an increasing
function of the end-of-period total public debt as share of output, Dt
PHt Y
H
t
, when the latter
exceeds a certain threshold. In the robustness section below, we will also study the case where
the country premium is increasing in the countrys net foreign liabilities or debt.11
In particular, following e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) and García-Cicco et al. (2010),
we use:
Qt = Q

t +  
 
e

Dt
PHt Y
H
t
 d

  1
!
(15)
where the world interest rate, Qt , is exogenously given, d is an exogenous threshold value
above which the interest rate on government debt starts rising above Qt and the parameter  
measures the elasticity of the interest rate with respect to deviations of total public debt from
its threshold value (see subsection 3.1 below for these parameter values).12
2.6 Exchange rate and scal policy regimes
To solve the model, we need to specify the exchange rate and the scal policy regimes. Con-
cerning exchange rate policy, since the model is applied to Italy over the last decade, we solve it
for a case without monetary policy independence. In particular, we assume that the nominal
exchange rate, St; is exogenously set and, at the same time, the domestic nominal interest
10See also Christiano et al. (2011), García-Cicco et al. (2010) and many others for endogenous country
premia. Note that, although endogeneity of the country premium is also used by the literature on sovereign
default, the study of the latter is beyond the scope of our paper. As Corsetti et al. (2013) point out, there are
two approaches to sovereign default. The rst models it as a strategic choice of the government (Eaton and
Gersovitz, 1981, Arellano, 2008, and many others). The second assumes that default occurs when debt exceeds
its endogenous limit (Bi, 2012, and many others).
11As said above, this rather common assumption (namely, that the interest rate, at which the country borrows
from the rest of the world, is increasing in public and/or foreign debt) is supported by a number of empirical
studies (see e.g. European Commission, 2012).
12The value of d can be thought of as any value of debt above which sustainability concerns start arising. As
we discuss below in subsections 3.1 and 6.1, our qualitative results are robust to the exact value of d used, to
the extent that each time the value of  is recalibrated.
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rate on domestic government bonds, Rt; becomes an endogenous variable.13 Concerning scal
policy, we assume that, along the transition, the residually determined public nancing policy
instrument is the end-of-period total public debt, Dt (see below for other public nancing cases
at the steady state).
Before we turn to scal policy rules in the next subsection, it is worth clarifying that, along
the transition path, nominal rigidities imply that money is not neutral so that monetary policy,
and the exchange rate regime in particular, matter to the real economy.
2.7 Fiscal policy rules
Without room for monetary policy independence, only scal policy can be used for policy
action. In this paper, we follow a rule-like approach to policy. We focus on simple rules,
meaning that the scal authorities react to a small number of easily observable macroeconomic
indicators capturing the current state of the economy. The magnitude of reaction coe¢ cients
(namely, how scal policy instruments respond to macroeconomic indicators) will be chosen
optimally.
Specically, we allow the main spending-tax policy instruments (namely, government spend-
ing as share of output, sgt , and the tax rates on consumption, capital income and labor income,
 ct , 
k
t and 
n
t ),
14 to react to the public liabilities to output ratio as deviation from a target
value, (lt 1   l), as well as to the contemporaneous output gap,
 
yHt   yH

, according to the
simple linear rules:15
sgt   sg =  gl (lt 1   l)  gy
 
yHt   yH

(16)
 ct    c = cl (lt 1   l) + cy
 
yHt   yH

(17)
kt   k = kl (lt 1   l) + ky
 
yHt   yH

(18)
nt   n = nl (lt 1   l) + ny
 
yHt   yH

(19)
13This is similar to the modeling of e.g. Erceg and Linde (2012). Recall that in the case of exible or managed
oating exchange rates, St and Rt switch positions, in the sense that St becomes an endogenous variable, while
Rt is used as a policy instrument usually assumed to follow a Taylor-type rule for the nominal interest rate (see
Section 7 below).
14We focus on "distorting" policy instruments, because using lump-sum instruments (like  lt in our model) to
bring public debt down would be like a free lunch.
15For similar rules, see e.g Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), Bi (2010) and Cantore et al. (2012). As said
above, see European Commission (2011) for similar scal reaction functions used in practice. On the other
hand, see Kliem and Kriwoluzky (2014) for a critical approach.
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where, from the government budget constraint in subsection 2.4, lt 1 is dened as:
lt 1 =
Rt 1t 1Dt 1 +Qt 1 StSt 1 (1  t 1)Dt 1
PHt 1yHt 1
and where, in the above rules (16)-(19), variables without time subscripts denote policy target
values and ql , 
q
y  0 for q  (g; c; k; n) are feedback policy coe¢ cients on the public debt
and output targets respectively. The rest of scal policy instruments (namely, lump-sum
government tranfers as share of output, denoted as slt, and the share of domestic public debt in
total public debt, t) are assumed to be constant over time and equal to their average values
in the data (see subsection 2.8 below).
Notice that, in the above rules, a policy target value (like sg,  c, k, n, l, yH) will be the
steady state value of the corresponding variable. This value will depend on whether we are
in the status quo economy, or in a reformed economy. For example, as further discussed in
section 4 below, the debt policy target, l, can be either the average public debt-to-GDP ratio
in the data (this will be the benchmark case without reforms where scal policy adjusts so
as to keep the public debt ratio at its average value) or it can be set to a value less than in
the data (this will be the case of debt consolidation where scal policy systematically brings
public debt down over time).
Also, keep in mind that below we will also allow for persistence in policy instruments, as
well as for the case in which the debt policy target is not xed but it follows an AR(1) rule
(see section 6 below).
2.8 Exogenous variables and shocks
In this subsection, we dene the exogenous variables and, among them, the exogenous stochas-
tic processes that drive extrinsic uctuations in our model.
We assume that foreign imports or equivalently domestic exports, cFt , are a function of
terms of trade, TTt  P
F
t
PHt
, where both variables are expressed as deviations from their steady
state values:
cFt
cF
=

TTt
TT

(20)
where 0 <  < 1 is a parameter. The idea is that foreign imports rise as the domestic econ-
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omy becomes more competitive (the value of the exogenous cF is specied in the calibration
subsection 3 below).
Regarding the other rest-of-the-world variables, namely, the exogenous part of the foreign
interest rate, Qt , and the gross rate of domestic ination in the foreign country, Ht =
PHt
PHt 1
,
we assume that they are constant over time and equal to Qt = 1:0115 (which is the data
average value - see below) and Ht  1 at all t.
Regarding the exogenously set policy instruments, we set the nominal exchange rate St at
1 (under xed exchange rates), while, the output share of government tranfers, slt, and the
fraction of domestic public debt in total public debt, t, are set at their data averages values
at all t (see subsection 3.1 below).
Finally, in the main part of the paper, stochasticity comes from shocks to TFP, which
follows:
log (At) = (1  a) log (A) + a log (At 1) + "t (21)
where 0 < a < 1 is a parameter, "at  N
 
0; 2a

and, as said above, variables without time
subscript denote steady state values. As we report below in section 6, our main results do not
change when we add extra shocks, like shocks to the world interest rate.
2.9 Decentralized equilibrium (for any feasible policy)
We now combine all the above equations to present the Decentralized Equilibrium (DE) which
is for any feasible policy. The DE is dened to be a sequence of allocations, prices and policies
such that: (i) households maximize utility; (ii) a fraction (1  ) of rms maximize prots by
choosing an identical price dened as P#t ; while a fraction  just set prices at their previous
period level; (iii) all constraints, including the government budget constraint and the balance of
payments, are satised; (iv) markets clear; (v) policymakers follow the feedback rules assumed
in subsection 2.7. This DE is given the values of feedback policy coe¢ cients in the policy rules
(16)-(19), the exogenous variables, fcFt ; Qt ;Ht ; t; slt; t; Atg1t=0, which have been dened
in subsection 2.8, and initial conditions for the state variables.
We thus end up with a rst-order non-linear dynamic system of 32 equations. Algebraic
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details, the nal equilibrium system and the associated steady state (also used for calibration)
are in Appendix D.
2.10 Solution methodology
We will work as follows. In the next section (section 3), we solve the above model numerically
employing parameter values and data in accordance with the Italian economy over 2001-2013.
As we shall see, the steady state solution of this model economy will do well at mimicking the
output shares of key macroeconomic variables observed in the Italian data since 2001; hence,
we will call it the "status quo steady state". In turn, the next sections will study the transition
dynamics, when we depart from this status quo steady state and travel to a new reformed steady
state (the latter is dened in section 4.1 below). To compute the transition dynamics, driven
by policy reforms (like debt consolidation policies) and/or exogenous stochastic proccesses (like
TFP shocks), we will take a second-order aproximation of the stochastic problem around the
deterministic new reformed steady state.16 In all policy experiments, the feedback coe¢ cients
in the policy rules are computed optimally to maximize the households welfare.
Further details on the reformed economy and the computational methodology are in section
4 below. The quantitative implementation is in sections 5 and 6. But we rst need to solve
for the status quo steady state. This is in the next section.
3 Data, parameterization and the status quo steady state
This section parameterizes the above model economy using average data from Italy over 2001-
2013 (the exact end period for each variable may vary depending on data availability) and
then presents the resulting steady state solution. As said, the latter will then serve as a point
of departure to study policy reforms.
16A potential criticism might be that an approximate solution might not be reliable because we approximate
the equilibrium equations around a new steady state di¤erent from the initial one. To address this issue, we
have also solved a deterministic version of the model using non-linear, or non-approximate, numerical methods.
This means that we repeat the equilibrium equations in each time period until the economy converges to a
steady state position where variable changes are negiligible. We use Dynare for these computations. The key
results, namely the optimal policy mix during the transition, do not change.
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3.1 Data and parameter values
The data are from Eurostat over 2001-2013 (in the case of TFP, the data source is Ameco over
1980-2014). The time unit is meant to be a year. In calibrating the model, we assume that the
economy is in the deterministic steady state of the decentralized equilibrium presented above
with zero ination (see Appendix D for the steady state system). Recall that, since policy
instruments react to deviations of macroeconomic indicators from their steady state values,
feedback policy coe¢ cients do not play any role at the steady state.
The baseline parameter values, as well as the values of the scal policy variables, are listed
in Table 1. As reported in detail in section 6, our results are robust to changes in these
parameter values.
[Table 1 here]
The value of the time preference rate, , follows from setting the gross interest rate at
R = Q = 1:0225 (the latter is consistent with an interest-rate premium of 1.1% over the
German 10-year bond rate, which is the average value in the data, and with a gross ination
rate equal to one at the steady state).
The value of a implies a labor share, (1   a), equal to 0.62, which is the average value in
the Italian data over 2001-2013. We employ conventional parameter values, as used by the
literature, for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1=, the inverse of Frisch labour
elasticity, , and the price elasticity of demand, , which are as in e.g. Andrès and Doménech
(2006) and Galí (2008). Regarding the preference parameters in the utility function, n is
calibrated from the households labour supply condition, while g is set at 0.1. The price
rigidity parameter, , is set at 0:5. The value of , in equation (20) for foreign imports, is set
at 0.9.
In our baseline parameterization, the threshold parameter value of the public debt to
GDP ratio above which sovereign interest-rate premia emerge, d; is set at 0.9 (see equation
(15)). This value is consistent with evidence provided by e.g. Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010)
and Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012) that, in most advanced economies, the adverse
e¤ects of public debt arise when it is around 90-100% of GDP. It is also within the range of
thresholds for sustainable public debt estimated by the European Commission (2011). In turn,
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the associated premium parameter,  , is calibrated by using equation (15). In other words,
assuming a value for the parameter d, and using data averages over the sample period for the
interest-rate premium and the public debt to GDP ratio, the value of  follows from equation
(15). In our baseline parameterization, the resulting value of  is 0.0505, which means that
a one percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio leads to an increase in the interest
rate premium by 5.05 basis points. Such values are in line with empirical ndings for OECD
countries (see e.g. Ardagna et al., 2008). As reported in subsection 6.1 below, our results are
robust to changes in d, to the extent that each time we recalibrate  .
The parameters h and g, measuring adjustment costs associated with changes in private
and public foreign assets respectively (see equations (9) and (14)) are both set to 0.3. As
already said above, this value gives plausible short-run dynamics for private foreign assets and,
in turn, for the countrys net foreign debt following a policy reform. Robustness checks for
both h and g are reported in subsection 6.1 below. We also report that a positive value for
h is needed to give bounded solutions for the welfare when we compute optimized feedback
policy rules below. Similarly, the value of  measuring capital adjustment costs is set equal to
0.3.
Concerning the exogenous variables, the persistence and standard deviation parameters
in the TFP process (21) are set at a = 0:9479 and a = 0:007636: These values have been
estimated by running simple regressions using Ameco data for total factor productivity. As
reported below, our results are robust to changes in these parameter values. Regarding the
rest-of-the world variables, Ht , Qt and cFt , we set their steady state values equal to H  1;
Q =1.0115 (which is the data average) and c
F
cF
= 1:01 (which is the ratio of exports to imports
in the Italian data).
The steady state values of scal and public nance policy instruments,  ct , 
k
t ; 
n
t ; s
g
t ;
slt; t are set at their data averages. In particular, 
c; k; n are the e¤ective tax rates
on consumption, capital and labor in the data over 2001-2013. Moreover, sg and sl; namely,
government spending on goods/services and on transfer payments as shares of output, are set
at their average values in the data, 0.2222 and 0.2326 respectively. Finally, ; the fraction of
total public debt held by domestic private agents is set at 0:64; which is again its average value
in the data during the same period.
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3.2 Status quo steady state
The steady state system is in Appendix D. Table 2 presents the numerical solution of this
system when we use the parameter values and policy instruments in Table 1. In this solution,
we treat total public debt, d, as the residually determined public nancing instrument. In
Table 2, we also present some key ratios in the Italian data. Notice that most of the solved
ratios, produced endogenously by the model, are meaningful and close to their actual values.
For instance, the solution for the countrys net foreign debt as share of output (denoted asef)17 is 0:2134; its average value in the data is 0.2109. Also, the solution for total public debt
as share of output18 is 1.0965; its average value in the data is 1.098.
In what follows, this steady state solution will serve as a point of departure to study various
policy experiments. Before we move on to reforms, it is worth pointing out that, in the above
model, a lower public debt implies a lower sovereign premium and this leads to higher capital,
higher output and higher welfare; this can rationalize the debt consolidation policies studied
in what follows.
[Table 2 here]
4 Description of policy experiments
In this section, we dene the policy reform studied, how we model debt consolidation and how
we compute optimized feedback policy rules.
4.1 Denition of the reformed economy
The main experiment we want to consider in this paper is the case in which the economy
departs from the status quo and travels over time to a new reformed state with lower debt.
Regarding the status quo, this is provided by the steady state solution of the model economy
calibrated and solved numerically in the previous section (see Tables 1 and 2). Regarding the
new reformed steady state, this is dened as the case in which the public debt-to-GDP ratio
17Thus, ef  St(Fgt  Fht )
PHyH
=
(1 t)Dt StFht
PHt y
H
t
= (1 )TT
1 d TTfh
yH
, where TTt  P
F
t
PHt
is the terms of trade.
Details are in Appendix D.
18This is D
PHyH
 TT1 d
yH
, where TTt  P
F
t
PHt
is the terms of trade. Details are in Appendix D.
18
is permanently reduced, so as there are no sovereign interest-rate premia in the new steady
state. In other words, in the new reformed steady state, we set Q = Q so that TT
1 d
yH
= d.
Specically, the government reduces the output share of public debt from 1.0965 (which is the
status quo solution) to the threshold value of d = 0:9 corresponding with zero premia. To put
it di¤erently, since, in our model, sovereign premia arise whenever the public debt-to-output
ratio happens to be above the 0.9 threshold, premia are eliminated (Q = Q) once such debt
reduction has been achieved. As said above, we will conduct robustness exercices for the values
of the exogenously set threshold, d. Also, again as a robustness check, we will consider the case
in which the new reformed steady state is the Ramsey steady state, meaning that the policy
targets are the Ramsey steady state values.
In addition, we assume that, in the new reformed steady state, the countrys net foreign
debt position is zero or, equivalently, that the country ends up with a balanced trade.19 In
other words, in the new reformed steady state, we set the countrys net foreign debt as share
of output to zero, ef = 0. This means that the countrys net foreign debt as share of output
is permanently reduced from 0.2134 (which is the status quo solution) to zero. Note that this
assumption is not important to our qualitative results (its robustness is checked in subsection
6.1 below) but, if the foreign position of the country is left free in the long run with relatively
low interest rates (Q = Q), private agents have an incentive to overborrow and this leads to
unrealistically high values of private foreign debt, fh < 0.
Details of the equilibrium conditions of the reformed economy, the steady state implied by
these conditions, as well as numerical solutions of the reformed steady state under unrestricted
or restricted ef; and under alternative public nancing scenarios, are provided in Appendix E.
4.2 Public debt consolidation and the intertemporal tradeo¤
It is widely recognized that debt consolidation implies a tradeo¤ between short-term scal
pain and medium-term scal gain. In our model, during the early phase of the transition, debt
consolidation comes at the cost of higher taxes and/or lower public spending. On the other
hand, in the medium- and long-run, a reduction in the debt burden allows, other things equal,
a cut in tax rates, and/or a rise in public spending. Thus, one has to value the early costs of
19For a similar practice (namely, to assume a zero net foreign debt position in the steady state and then check
its robustness), see e.g. Mendoza and Tesar (2005).
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stabilization vis-a-vis the medium- and long-term benets from the scal space created.
This intertemporal tradeo¤ also implies that the implications of consolidation depend heav-
ily on the public nancing policy instruments used, namely, which policy instrument adjusts
endogenously to accommodate the exogenous change in scal policy (see also e.g. Leeper et
al., 2009, and Davig and Leeper, 2011). Specically, these implications depend both on which
policy instrument bears the cost of adjustment in the early period of adjustment and on which
policy instrument is anticipated to reap the benet, once consolidation has been achieved. In
the policy experiments we consider below, we experiment with scal policy mixes, which means
that the scal authority can use various instruments in the transition and in the steady state.
Details are in subsection 5.3 below.
4.3 The reformed economy vs a reference regime
To evaluate the implications of debt consolidation as dened in subsection 4.1 above, we need
to compare them to a reference regime. Here, we nd it natural to use as reference regime
the case without debt consoldation other things equal. In other words, we will study two
scenaria regarding policy action. The rst, used as a reference, is the scenario without debt
consolidation. Here, the role of policy is only to stabilize the economy against shocks. For
instance, say that the economy is hit by an adverse temporary TFP shock, which, as the
impulse response functions reveal, produces a contraction in output, a rise in the public debt
to output ratio and a rise in the sovereign premium. Then, the policy questions are which
policy instrument to use, and how strong the reaction of policy instruments to deviations from
targets should be, in order to maximize households welfare criterion. Note that, in this case,
the values of the policy targets in the feedback rules (16)-(19) are given by the status quo
steady state solution. In other words, in this policy scenario, we depart from, and end up, at
the status quo steady state solution of subsection 3.2 above, so that transition dynamics are
driven by exogenous shocks only.
The scenario with debt consolidation is richer. Now the role of policy is twofold: to stabilize
the economy against the same shocks as above and, at the same time, to improve resource
allocation by gradually reducing the debt to GDP ratio over time as dened in subsection 4.1.
The policy questions are as above in the reference regime, except that now the policy targets in
20
the feedback rules (16)-(19) are given by the steady state solution of the new reformed economy.
In other words, in this case, we depart from the status quo solution with sovereign premia,
but we end up at a new reformed steady state with lower (public and foreign) debt. Thus,
now there are two sources of transition dynamics: temporary shocks and the deterministic
di¤erence between the initial and the new reformed long run (see also Cantore et al., 2012).
4.4 Computational methodology
Irrespectively of the policy experiments studied, to make the comparison of di¤erent policy
regimes meaningful, we compute optimized policy rules, so that our results do not depend
on ad hoc di¤erences in feedback policy coe¢ cients across di¤erent policy rules. The welfare
criterion is the households expected discounted lifetime utility (see equations (7)-(8) above).
We work as follows: First, we take a second-order approximation of the equilibrium condi-
tions, as well as of households expected discounted lifetime utility, around the deterministic
reformed steady state (see Appendix E for the latter).20 This is a function of feedback policy
coe¢ cients in the policy rules and initial values for the state variables. Secondly, we select the
feedback policy coe¢ cients so as to maximize the conditional mean of households expected
discounted lifetime utility, where conditionality refers to the initial conditions chosen; the lat-
ter are given by the status quo steady state solution (see subsection 3.2 above). Thus, the
initial values of the endogenous and exogenous predetermined variables are set equal to their
status quo values. If necessary, the ranges of the feedback policy coe¢ cients or, equivalently,
the values of the policy instruments themselves, will be restricted to give determinate solutions
and/or meaningful values for policy instruments (e.g. tax rates less than one and non-negative
nominal interest rates). All this is similar to Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a, 2005, 2007).21
As said above, we work similarly in the case without debt consolidation (where we depart from,
and return to, the same status quo steady state) which serves as a reference regime.
20Thus, we take a second-order approximation to both the equilibrium conditions and the welfare criterion.
As is known, this is consistent with risk-averse behavior on the part of economic agents and can also help us
to avoid possible spurious welfare results that may arise when one takes a second-order approximation to the
welfare criterion combined with a rst-order approximation to the equilibrium conditions (see e.g. Gali, 2008,
and Benigno and Woodford, 2012).
21Specically, to compute a second-order accurate approximation of both the conditional welfare and the
decentralized equilbrium, as functions of feedback policy coe¢ cients, we use the perturbation method of Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2004a). In turn, we use a matlab function (such as fminsearch.m) to compute the values of
the feedback policy coe¢ cients that maximize this approximation.
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5 Macroeconomic implications of scal consolidation
In this section, we present the main results. The emphasis will be on the case of the re-
formed economy as dened in subsection 4.1 above, but, for reasons of comparison, we will
also present results for the reference case without debt consolidation. Recall that, in the case
of debt consolidation, transition dynamics are driven both by a temporary supply shock and
by deterministic changes in scal policy instruments aiming at debt reduction and elimination
of the sovereign premium over time.
5.1 Steady state utility and output in the reformed economy
The steady state of the reformed economy with debt consolidation is as dened in the previous
section, while details are in Appendix E. Thanks to the scal space created by debt reduction,
public spending can rise or a tax rate can be reduced residually.
Table 3 summarizes steady-state utility and output under alternative public nancing sce-
narios in this reformed economy (for the full numerical solutions, see Appendix E). In the
rst row of Table 3, the assumption is that it is public spending that takes advantage of debt
reduction, in the sense that, once the debt burden has been reduced, public spending can
increase relative to its value in the status quo solution. In the next three rows, the scal space
is used to nance cuts in one of the three tax rates. The last row reports, for comparison, the
case in which it is lump-sum tranfers, sl, that rise. The best outome (both in terms of utility
and output) is achieved when the scal space is used to nance a cut in capital tax rates.
This is as expected and is consistent with the Chamley-Judd normative result. Therefore, in
what follows, we will use the capital tax rare, k, as the residually determined scal policy
instrument in the steady state of the reformed economy with debt consolidation.
[Table 3 here]
5.2 Determinacy and bounds on policy coe¢ cients
As is known, local determinacy, or implementability, depends crucially on the values of feedback
policy coe¢ cients in the rules (16)-(19) above. This is also the case in our model. Our
experiments show that economic policy can ensure determinacy when at least one of the scal
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policy instruments (sgt , 
c
t , 
k
t , 
n
t ) reacts to public liabilities between critical minimum and
maximum values, where these bounds vary depending on which scal policy instrument is
used. In other words, determinacy requires restrictions on the magnitude of ql , where q 
(g; c; k; n).22 By contrast, the values of qy, measuring the reaction of scal policy instruments
to the output gap, are not found to be critical to determinacy.
Nevertheless, although not important for determinacy, we set bounds on the feedback
reaction of the capital tax rate to the output gap, ky , so as the implied capital tax rate is within
0:11 < kt < 0:51 in the transition. In other words, since the average value of 
k
t in the data
is 0.31, we limit attention to changes in kt that are less than minus/plus 20 percentage points
than in the data. We set these bounds because, if the capital tax rate were left unrestricted,
the policymaker would nd it optimal to set it at a very low value as one would expect given
the Chamley-Judd logic. Our bounds exclude this possibility. Note that such practice is usual
in the related literature; for instance, when they compute optimized rules, Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2007) and Kliem and Kriwoluzky (2014) impose similar intervals for monetary and scal
policy respectively.
5.3 Optimal scal policy mix
We can now study optimal policy mixes when we depart from the status quo steady state and
travel towards the reformed steady state as dened in subsection 4.1 above. Policymakers are
allowed to use di¤erent instruments in the transition and in the steady state.23 In particualr,
in the reformed steady state, given the evidence in Table 3, we assume that it is the capital tax
rate that takes advantage of the scal space created once the debt burden has been reduced
and sovereign premia have been eliminated; as said, a cut in the capital tax rate is the most
e¢ cient way of using this scal space. On the other hand, in the transition to this reformed
steady state, all available scal instruments, and at the same time, are allowed to be used, as
in the policy rules (16)-(19). Since feedback policy coe¢ cients are chosen optimally, this will
also tell us how to assign di¤erent policy instruments to di¤erent macroeconomic indicators.
22For example, when we use one scal instrument at a time, the ranges of scal reaction to public liabilities
are 0.027< gl < 2:72, 0.048< 
c
l < 4:34, 0.064< 
k
l < 2:96, 0.063< 
n
l < 1:56 for s
g
t , 
c
t , 
k
t and 
n
t respectively.
When we switch on all scal instruments, these ranges become narrower.
23Results in the special case in which the scal authority is restricted to use one scal instrument at a time
are in Appendix E. These results can help to undestand the working of the model. Here, we only present the
optimal mix, where are instruments can be used simultaneously, to save on space.
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Results for the optimal mix during the transition to the reformed steady state are reported in
Table 4.
[Table 4 here]
The values of the optimized feedback policy coe¢ cients in Table 4 imply a clear-cut assig-
ment of instruments to targets. Government spending should be used to address the public
debt problem, while income (capital and labor) taxes should be used to address the output
problem. On the other hand, it is better to avoid changes in consumption tax rates (the opti-
mized feedback coe¢ cients in the rule for the consumption tax rate are practically zero in this
case). These signs and magnitudes of the feedback policy coe¢ cients mean that government
spending should be reduced in order to bring public debt down, while, at the same time, the
capital and labor tax rates should be also cut so as to stimulate the real economy in an attempt
to increase the denominator in the debt-to-output ratio (impulse response functions are shown
below).
Table 5 also reports some associated statistics (like elasticities and min/max values).24 As
can be seen, in the short term, public spending should fall by a lot vis-a-vis its data value so
as to bring public debt down and, at the same time, capital and labor tax rates should also fall
by a lot vis-a-vis the data to stimulate the real economy. Then, over time, they return to their
data average values (this is also shown by impulse response functions below). In subsection
5.6 below, we also report results when the use of policy instruments is restricted.
[Table 5 here]
5.4 Welfare over time with, and without, debt consolidation
Setting the feedback policy coe¢ cients as in Table 4, the associated expected discounted utility
over various time horizons is reported in the rst row of Table 6. Studying what happens to
welfare over various time horizons can be useful because, for several (e.g. political-economy)
reasons, economic agents can be short-sighted. It can also help us to understand the possible
conicts between short-, medium- and long-term e¤ects from debt consolidation. The second
24The elasticities report the percentage change in the scal instrument with respect to a 1% change in the
macroeconomic indicator, other things equal.
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row in Table 6 reports results without debt consolidation, other things equal. Thus, we again
compute the best policy mix meaning that all scal policy instruments at the same time are
allowed to react to debt and output gaps but now the debt and output targets in the policy rules
remain as in the status quo solution (see subsection 4.3 above). Finally, the last row in Table
6 gives the welfare gain, or loss, of debt consolidation expressed in permanent consumption
equivalent units. A positive number means that welfare would increase with debt consolidation.
And vice versa: a negative number means that welfare would decrease with debt consolidation.
[Table 6 here]
The results in Table 6 reveal that, other things equal, debt consolidation improves welfare
only if we are relatively far-sighted. In particular, expected discounted utility is higher with
debt consolidation, only when we care beyond the rst ten years. Reversing the argument,
debt consolidation comes at a short-term cost.25 Once the short-term pain is over, the welfare
gain in consumption equivalents is substantial.26
5.5 Impulse response functions with debt consolidation
To get a clearer picture of the above results, we also present the implied impulse response
functions illustrating the time paths of the scal policy instruments used for consolidation as
well as some key macroeconomic variables. They are shown in Figure 1. As can be seen, public
spending should fall, while, at the same time, capital and labor tax rates should be cut, for
the reasons discussed above. This optimal mix allows a gradual reduction in the public debt
to GDP ratio, in the foreign debt to GDP ratio and in the interest-rate premium. Private
consumption falls in the short term, as a consequence of debt consolidation, but recovers soon.
Hours of work need to rise (or leisure to fall) for some time. All variables converge to their
new, reformed values over time.
25 It should be pointed out that the rise in welfare is partly driven by the fact that debt consolidation and
elimination of sovereign premia in the reformed long-run equilibrium allow a higher value of the time preference
rate than in the pre-reformed long-run solution in section 3 (in particular, the calibrated value of  was 0.978
in the status quo steady state in section 3, while it is 0.9886 without premia). We report that the main results
do not change when we allow for persistence in the change of the time preference rate as it rises from 0.978 to
0.9886. Actually, when we allow the related autoregressive parameter to be optimally chosen, along the feedback
policy coe¢ cients, its optimal value is close to zero meaning that it is better to adopt as soon as possible the
higher value of the time preference rate. Results are available upon request.
26Prescott (2002) nds welfare gains of similar magnitude when Japan or France adopt the tax policy or the
production e¢ ciency of the USA.
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[Figure 1 here]
5.6 Further restrictions on the use of scal policy instruments
One could argue that the values of tax-spending policy instruments cannot di¤er substantially
from those in the historical data (for various political economy reasons). Therefore, we now
redo the main computations restricting the magnitude of feedback coe¢ cients in the policy
rules so as all tax-spending policy instruments cannot change by more than, say, 10 percentage
points from their averages in the data. The new results are reported in Appendix E. Although
obviously feedback policy coe¢ cients are now smaller, the best scal policy mix again implies
that we should earmark public spending for the reduction of public debt and, at the same
time, cut taxes to mitigate the recessionary e¤ects of debt consolidation. The only di¤erence
is that now, since cuts in income (capital and labor) taxes are restricted, we should also cut
consumption taxes.
In the same Appendix (Appendix E), we compare results when the scal authorities use
the optimal scal mix to results when they are restricted to use one scal instrument at a time
only. The message from the new impulse response functions is that the reduction in public
debt is more gradual when we use all scal instruments, and this allows a smaller fall in private
cosumption, than when the scal authorities are restricted to use one instrument at a time
only. This is intuitive: a policy mix gives more choices.
6 Sensitivity analysis
This section checks the sensitivity of the above results. We start with changes in parameter
values and then study robustness to more substantial, modeling changes. To save on space, we
will selectively provide some results only (a full set of results is available upon request from
the authors).
6.1 Changes in parameter values
We start with the value of the public debt threshold parameter, d, in the interest-rate premium
equation (15). Recall that so far we have set d = 0:9. Our qualitative results do not depend on
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this value. For instance, in Appendix F, we present the main results with d = 0:8 and d = 1.
In this case, as said above, we need to recalibrate the value of  so as to hit the data again;
the new values are respectively  = 0:0319 and  = 0:108.
Our results are also robust to changes in the assumed value of net foreign debt in the steady
state of the reformed economy. Recall that so far we have solved for the reformed economy
assuming a zero net foreign debt position at steady state, ef = 0. Our main results remain
unchanged when we instead set ef = 0:1 and ef = 0:2109 in the reformed steady state (where
0:2109 is the average value of the countrys foreign debt in the data). Results for these two
cases are presented in Appendix G.
Our qualitative results are also robust to changes in other model parameters. For instance,
we have experimented with changes in the values of the Calvo parameter in the rms problem,
, and the adjustment cost parameters on foreign private assets/debt, h, foreign public debt,
g, and physical capital, . We report that our main results do not change when we set  at,
say, 0, 0.1 or 0.9 (we also report that as price stickiness, , rises, the optimal scal reaction to
public debt becomes milder), when 0:2  h  0:5 and 0    2, while the value of g has
not been found to be important. Similarly, our results remain unchanged for 0:8    0:99,
which measures the sensitivity of exports to changes in the terms of trade in equation (20).
Also, our main results do not depend on the value of g, namely, how much agents value public
consumption spending in the utility function. The values of the labor supply parameters, n
and , are not crucial either; nevertheless, we report that when  = 0:5; the reaction of the
labor tax rate to the debt target is zero, i.e. nl = 0, while when  = 2, we get 
n
l = 0:3761:
That is, as  (namely, the inverse of the Frisch elasticity) rises, the reaction of the labor tax
rate to the debt target becomes stronger which, in turn, means that the net cut in the labor
tax rate should be smaller. As said, the above results are available upon request.
6.2 Changes in policy variables
Our results are also robust to the specic way we model the scal policy instruments. For
instance, the main results remain una¤ected when we allow for persistence in the feedback
policy rules, (16)-(19), in the sense that, for example in the case of the consumption tax rate,
we use:
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 ct =
 
1  c  c + c ct 1 + cl (lt 1   l) + cy  yHt   yH (22)
where 0  c  1 is an autoregressive policy parameter and the initial value of the policy
instrument is its data average value as reported in Tables 1 and 2. Actually, we have also
allowed 
c
to be optimally chosen, jointly with the other feedback policy coe¢ cients, and the
main results again do not change. Interestingly, the optimized value of these autoregressive
policy parameters are found to be relatively small meaning that it is better to adjust the policy
instrument(s) relatively soon.
Also, following several related papers (see e.g. Coenen et al., 2008, Forni et al., 2010a, and
Erceg and Lindé, 2013), we have experimented with time-varying debt policy targets. Thus,
instead of using a constant over time debt policy target, l, like in equations (16)-(19) above,
we assume that the target, dened now as lt , follows an AR(1) process of the form:
lt =

1  l

l + llt 1 (23)
where 0  l  1 is an autogressive policy parameter and the initial value of the target is given
by its data average value in Tables 1 and 2. We report that our main results remain the same
under this new specication.
Our results are also robust to adding more macroeconomic indicators in the feedback policy
rules (like ination or terms of trade). We have also experimented with changes in some
exogenous policy instruments, which have been kept constant so far, like the fraction of public
debt held by domestic agents relative to foreign investors, . The latter has so far been kept
constant and equal to its average value on the data, 0.64. When we experiment with  = 0:54
and  = 0:74, the results do not change.
6.3 Allowing for new shocks
Our results are also robust to allowing for a more volatile economy. This can be captured by
increasing the standard deviation of the existing TFP shock and/or by adding new shocks.
Specically, regarding new shocks, we have experimented with adding shocks to the scal
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policy rules in subsection 2.7, to the time-varying debt policy target presented in subsection
6.2 above, or to the world interest rate in equation (15). The main results again do not change.
In particular, regarding shocks to the world interest rate, and following the specication of
García-Cicco et al. (2010), we augment equation (15) by:
Qt = Q

t +  
 
e

Dt
PHt Y
H
t
 d

  1
!
+

e"

q
t 1
t   1

(24)
where
log (qt ) = 
q log
 
qt 1

+ "qt (25)
where 0  q  1 is a parameter and "qt is an iid shock. In our experiments, we set 0:9845 for
q and 0.0487 for the standard deviation of "qt .
27 The new results are reported in Appendix H.
As can be seen, the main messages remain the same. This is not suprising: the key driver of
transition dynamics is policy reforms, like debt consolidation, rather than cyclical uctuations
generated by exogenous shocks.
6.4 Transition to the Ramsey steady state
So far, we have studied the optimal transition of the economy from the status quo to an
arbitrarily reformed steady state. A potential criticism (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe,
2009, chapter 3) might be that the accuracy of approximation (in our paper, rst- and second-
order) is poor because, when the policymaker chooses the feedback policy coe¢ cients in such
cases, he/she may want to use his/her choices in order to inuence the mean of variables, rather
than to stabilize the economy around the assumed steady state. A way of checking whether
this a¤ects the main results is to approximate the economy around the Ramsey steady state,
meaning that the steady state policy targets in the feedback rules (16)-(19) are the Ramsey
steady state values of the corresponding variables.
Therefore, this subsection examines the optimal transition of the economy from the status
quo to the Ramsey steady state and compares this to the case studied so far, in which we
computed the optimal transition to an arbitrarily reformed steady state. By optimal transition,
27These estimates follow from OLS regressions of (25) where qt denotes the deviation of the 10-year German
bond rate from its average value on the data. The data for the 10-year German bond are from Eurostat,
2001-2013.
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we again mean that we select the feedback policy coe¢ cients so as to maximize the households
welfare criterion as above. The di¤erence is that now the steady state, around which we
approximate, is the steady state of the Ramsey second-best policy problem.28
The rst step is to solve the Ramsey second-best policy problem. In this problem, when
we use the so-called dual approach, the government chooses the time-paths of all endogenous
variables of the DE system plus the scal policy instruments taken as given at the DE level (see
e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2005, for a related problem). For simplicity, and following the
same authors, we solve for the so-called timeless Ramsey equilibrium, which means that the
optimality conditions in the initial periods do not di¤er from those in later periods. Besides,
to make the comparison to the previous cases meaningful, we again assume, as we have done
so far in the steady state of the arbitrarily reformed economy, that, in the steady state of the
Ramsey problem, the public debt to GDP ratio is set at 0.9 and that the countrys net foreign
debt position is zero.29 Details of the Ramsey policy problem are in Appendix I.
When we solve this Ramsey problem numerically using Dynare, the resulting steady state
solution (reported in Appendix I) gives us an unrealistically high consumption tax rate and
an equally large labour subsidy, i.e. n < 0. This is a well-known property of the Ramsey
problem, when the policymaker has also access to consumption taxes (see the early papers
by Lansing, 1999, and Coleman, 2000, and many others since then).30 In addition, our DE
economy does not seem to converge to this unrestricted Ramsey steady state. To overcome
these problems, and given the di¢ culty of setting negative labor tax rates in reality, we solve
the Ramsey problem by not letting the government to choose the labor tax rate, which is
now constrained to remain xed at, say, zero (n = 0). Actually, most of the above mentioned
literature on Ramsey policy with consumption taxes works similarly. The steady state solution
of this "restricted" Ramsey problem is reported in Table 7.
[Table 7 here]
28Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005, 2007) and Kliem and Kriwoluzky (2014), on the other hand, select the
feedback policy coe¢ cients so as to minimize the distance from the Ramsey solution.
29Actually, setting some debt values at exogenous values is necessary to get a well-dened steady state system
in the Ramsey problem. See also e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b). We provide details in Appendix I.
30Another related well-known property is that, at least in the baseline neoclassical growth model without
market frictions, the Ramsey government can implement the rst-best allocation if he/she has access to con-
sumption, labor and capital taxes.
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As can be seen, the implied utility and output are higher in the Ramsey steady state than in
all other cases studied so far. This is as expected. It is also worth noticing that, in this solution,
the capital tax rate is very low (but not zero since there are several market imperfections in
the model) and the consumption tax rate is well dened (although high, as one would expect
for the reasons discussed above).
The next step is to compute the optimal transition from the status quo steady state in
Table 2 to the Ramsey steady state in Table 7. Results for the optimal scal policy mix and
the associated welfare over di¤erent time horizons are reported in Tables 8 and 9 respectively.
These two tables need to be compared to Tables 4 and 6 respectively. As can be seen, the
main results are not a¤ected. Namely, it is again optimal to earmark public spending for the
reduction of public debt and, at the same time, to use the tax rates for the stimulation of the real
economy. The di¤erence is that since changes in the labor tax are now restricted (the Ramsey
labor tax rate has been set to zero) it is also optimal to make use of the consumption tax rate.
Namely, it is optimal, in the short term, to cut not only the capital tax rate, but also the
consumption tax rate; in later periods, the consumption tax rate rises substantially converging
to its high Ramsey steady state value in Table 7. Observe that now, as shown in Table 9,
the case with debt consolidation is superior to the reference case without debt consolidation
over all time horizons, even in the short term. Thus, an intuitive general message is that a
proper use of scal policy can mitigate (in our case, avoid) the short-term pain from debt
consolidation. But, of course, as is typically the case, the optimal Ramsey values for the scal
policy instruments are far away from their values in the data.
[Table 8 here]
[Table 9 here]
6.5 The interest-rate premium as a function of net foreign debt
So far, we have assumed that the sovereign interest-rate premium in equation (15) is a function
of the the public debt to GDP ratio. We now assume that the premium is a function of
the countrys net foreign debt ratio, ef  (1 )TT 1 d TT fh
yH
. The latter is another obvious
candidate for the emergence of country interest-rate premia. In particular, equation (15)
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changes to (assuming a zero threshold parameter in this case):31
Qt  Q =  
 
e
(1 )dTT1  TTfh
yH   1
!
(26)
The new results are summarized in Tables 10 and 11. As can be seen, by comparing Tables
10 and 11 to Tables 4 and 6 respectively, the main messages remain the same.
[Table 10 here]
[Table 11 here]
7 What would have happened under exible exchange rates?
This section resolves the baseline model developed in section 2 under the ction of exible
exchange rates, other things equal. Again, the initial conditions for the state variables will be
those of the steady state solution of the status quo model. In terms of modelling, the only
di¤erence from the model in section 2 is that now the exchange rate becomes an endogenous
variable. Thus, Rt and St exchange places. The former was endogenous in section 2, while
now it is the latter that becomes endogenous with the former being free to follow a national
Taylor-type rule for the nominal interest rate. In particular, we postulate:
log

Rt
R

=  log

t


+ y log

yHt
yH

+  log
t


(27)
where , y,   0 are feedback monetary policy coe¢ cients on price ination, output and
exchange rate depreciation respectively as deviations from their steady state values. This is
like the scal policy rules above. All feedback (monetary and scal) policy coe¢ cients are
again computed optimally, as described in section 4.
Since money is neutral in the long run (and H  1), a switch to exible exchange rates
does not a¤ect the solution of real variables in the steady state. Any di¤erences will thus
arise in the transition only, during which money is not neutral because of Calvo-type nominal
xities. Results are reported in Tables 12 and 13, which need to be compared to Tables 4 and
6 respectively (Appendix J also presents impulse response functions). The computed values of
31The value of  is recalibrated in the same way as explained in subsections 3.1 and 6.1 above (namely, to
hit the net foreign debt position in the data).
32
 and y are as typically found in the related literature (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe,
2007), while the high value of  implies that exchange rate stabilization is desirable. But, in
the context of our paper, the key result is that the optimal scal policy mix remains as above.
Notice also that the associated welfare is only slightly higher than that without monetary
policy independence in Table 4. In other words, to the extent that feedback policy coe¢ cients
are selected optimally, the loss of monetary policy independence is not a big loss, at least in
this class of New Keynesian models with Calvo- or Rotemberg-type nominal xities. This is
in line with the related literature (see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2015).32
[Table 12 here]
[Table 13 here]
8 Concluding remarks and possible extensions
This paper has studied scal policy action in a New Keynesian model of a small open economy
facing debt-elastic interest-rate premia and not being able to use monetary policy. Our analysis
was based on optimized, simple and implementable feedback policy rules for various categories
of tax rates and public spending.
Since the main results have been listed in the Introduction already, we close with some
possible extensions. Here, we have focused on the macroeconomic, or aggregate, implications
of alternative debt consolidation policies leaving out the issue of distributional implications. It
would be interesting to add heterogeneity both in terms of economic agents within the country
and in terms of countries. For instance, within each country, we could distinguish between those
who have access to nancial markets and those who just work and consume (the so-called rule-
of-thumb consumers); or between those working in the private sector and those working in
32Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2015) give the following explanation for the small di¤erences in macro per-
formance under xed and exible exchange rates in this class of models: increases in unemployment during
recessions are roughly o¤set by rises in work hours during expansions, so that the average level of employment,
and hence welfare, are a¤ected relatively little by the exchange rate regime (we report that, in our model,
impulse response functions for hours of work and real wages are very similar under exible and xed exchange
rates). It therefore seems that one has to add extra forms of nominal xities to make exible exchange rates,
and hence the use of independent monetary policy, more desirable. For instance, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2015) add downward nominal wage rigidity in a small open economy model and also assume a labour contract
according to which employment is demand determined during recessions but demand-supply determined during
booms. This implies that aggregate uctuations cause higher unemployment on average, so that having an extra
instrument for stabilization, like independent monetary policy, becomes useful.
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the public sector (public employees). It would be also interesting to use a two-country model,
where countries can di¤er in, say, scal imbalances and/or time preferences and so study the
asymmetric cross-border e¤ects of national stabilization and debt consolidation policies. We
leave these extensions for future work.
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9 Tables
Table 1: Baseline parameter values and policy variables
Parameter Value Description
a 0:38 share of capital
 0:9708 rate of time preference
 0:5 home goods bias parameter at home
 0:04 rate of capital depreciation
 6 price elasticity of demand
 1 inverse of Frisch labour elasticity
 1 elasticity of intertemporal substitution
 0:5 home goods bias parameter abroad
 0:5 price rigidity parameter
 0:0505 interest-rate premium parameter
n 3:66 preference parameter related to work e¤ort
g 0:1 preference parameter related to public spending
d 0:9 threshold parameter of public debt as share of output
a 0.9479 persistence of TFP (1980-2014)
a 0.007636 standard deviation of TFP (1980-2014)
 0:9 terms of trade elasticity of foreign imports
 0:3 adjustment cost parameter on physical capital
g 0:3 adjustment cost parameter on foreign public debt
h 0:3 adjustment cost parameter on private foreign assets/debt
 c 0:1756 consumption tax rate
k 0:3118 capital tax rate
n 0:421 labour tax rate
sg 0:2222 government spending on goods/services as share of GDP
sl 0:2326 government transfers as share of GDP
 0:64 fraction of total public debt held by domestic agents
cF
cF
1:01 exports to imports ratio
Table 2: Status quo steady state solution
Variables Description Steady-state solution Data
u period utility 0.8217 -
rk real return to physical capital 0.0908 -
w real wage rate 1.11378 -
n hours worked 0.331281 0.2183
yH output 0.712326 -
TT terms of trade 0.994923 -
Q Q interest rate premium 0.011 0.011
TT 1 c
yH
consumption as share of GDP 0.6335 0.5961
k
yH
physical capital as share of GDP 3.4872 -
TT 

fh
yH
private foreign assets as share of GDP 0.1813 0.1039
TT 1 d
yH
total public debt as share of GDP 1.0965 1.098ef countrys net foreign debt as share of GDP 0.2134 0.2109
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Table 3: Steady state utility and output in the reformed economy
residual scal
instrument
steady state
utility
steady state
output
sg 0.9125 0.82367
 c 0.9227 0.82367
k 0.9311 0.834774
n 0.9290 0.83139
sl 0.9180 0.817941
Table 4: Optimal scal reaction to debt and output with debt consolidation
scal
instruments
optimal reaction
to debt
optimal reaction
to output
sgt 
g
l = 0.5009 
g
y = 0
 ct 
c
l = 0 
c
y = 0
kt 
k
l = 0:0031 
k
y =2.2569
nt 
n
l =0.0753 
n
y =2.1360
Notes: (i) kt is the residual instrument at the reformed steady state. (ii) At all t, Rt  1,
0 < sgt , 
c
t , 
k
t , 
n
t < 1. (iii) Restriction on 
k
y so as 0:11 < 
k
t < 0:51. (iv) Lifetime utility
V0 = 79:9864.
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Table 5: Statistics implied by Table 4
Elasticity to
liabilities
Elasticity to
output
Min/max
5 periods
average
10 periods
average
20 periods
average
Data
average
sgt -2.52% 0% 0.1073/0.2352 0.1204 0.1383 0.1694 0.2222
 ct 0% 0% 0.1756/ 0.1756 0.1756 0.1756 0.1756 0.1756
kt 0.01% 5.13% 0.1443/0.3118 0.1901 0.2165 0.2470 0.3118
nt 0.2% 3.61% 0.2956/0.4379 0.3383 0.3607 0.3851 0.421
Notes: As in Table 4.
Table 6: Welfare over di¤erent time horizons
with, and without, debt consolidation
2 periods 4 periods 10 periods 20 periods 30 periods
with consolid.
without consolid.33
1:3576
(1:6251)
2:8154
(3:1791)
7:4589
(7:4481)
15:1321
(13:4127)
22:1331
(18:1904)
welfare gain/loss -0.0862 -0.0717 0.001 0.0959 0.1310
Notes: As in Table 4.
33 The values of the optimized feedback policy coe¢ cients without debt consolidation are gl = 0:2622; 
c
l =
0:3303; kl = 0:5819; 
n
l = 0:2510; 
g
y = 0:3157; 
c
y = 0:5772; 
k
y = 0; 
n
y = 0:0162:
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Table 7: Ramsey steady state solution with n = 0
Variables Description Steady-state solution
u period utility 1.0950
yH output 1.1162
TT terms of trade 1.01
k "optimal" capital tax rate 0.0500
 c "optimal" consumption tax rate 0.810199
Q Q interest rate premium 0
TT 1  c
yH
consumption as share of GDP 0.5443
k
yH
physical capital as share of GDP 5.8387
TT 
 fh
yH
private foreign assets as share of GDP 0.3240
D
PHyH
total public debt as share of GDP 0.9ef total foreign debt as share of GDP 0
Table 8: Optimal scal reaction to debt and output with debt consolidation
and a Ramsey steady state
scal
instruments
optimal reaction
to debt
optimal reaction
to output
sgt 
g
l = 0:6515 
g
y = 0:0102
 ct 
c
l = 0 
c
y = 1:9621
kt 
k
l = 0 
k
y = 0.6183
nt 
n
l = 0:0086 
n
y =0.0002
Notes: (i)-(iii) as in Table 4. (iv) V0 = 92:4789: (v) Optimal degree of persistence in scal
instruments,  = 0:2533.
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Table 9: Welfare over di¤erent time horizons
with, and without, debt consolidation and a Ramsey steady state
2 periods 4 periods 10 periods 20 periods 30 periods
with consolid.
without consolid.34
1:7351
(1:6251)
3:3455
(3:1791)
8:2102
(7:4481)
16:6584
(13:4127)
24:6462
(18:1904)
welfare gain/loss 0.0378 0.0346 0.0761 0.1888 0.2789
Notes: As in Table 8.
Table 10: Optimal scal reaction to debt and output with debt consolidation
and when the premium depends on foreign debt
scal
instruments
optimal reaction
to debt
optimal reaction
to output
sgt 
g
l = 0:5322 
g
y = 0:0005
 ct 
c
l = 0 
c
y = 0:2912
kt 
k
l = 0 
k
y = 2:9810
nt 
n
l = 0:283 
n
y = 2:9578
Notes: (i)-(iii) as in Table 4. (iv) V0 =79.9909.
34 The values of the optimized feedback policy coe¢ cients without debt consolidation are as in Table 6.
43
Table 11: Welfare over di¤erent time horizons
with, and without, debt consolidation and when the premium depends on foreign debt
2 periods 4 periods 10 periods 20 periods 30 periods
with consolid.
without consolid.35
1:3667
(1:6251)
2:8256
(3:1793)
7:4659
(7:4468)
15:1503
(13:4065)
22:1528
(18:1785)
welfare gain/loss -0.0834 -0.0698 0.0018 0.0974 0.1635
Notes: As in Table 10.
Table 12: Optimal reaction to infation, depreciation, debt and output with debt consolidation
(optimal monetary and scal policy mix) under exible exchange rates
Monetary Policy Fiscal Policy
Monetary
instrument
optimal reaction
to ination, output
and depreciation
Fiscal
instruments
optimal reaction
to debt
optimal reaction
to output
 = 1:36 s
g
t 
g
l = 0:5268 
g
y = 0:0001
Rt y = 0 
c
t 
c
l = 0 
c
y = 0
 = 100 
k
t 
k
l = 0:0012 
k
y = 2:782
nt 
n
l = 0:0744 
n
y = 2:1876
Notes: (i)-(iii) as in Table 4. (iv) V0 = 79:9954.
35 In the reference case without debt consolidation, the optimal feedbacks are gl = 0:3303; 
c
l = 0:0033;
kl = 0:7693; 
n
l = 0.2089, 
g
y = 0:3042; 
c
y = 0:4519; 
k
y = 0:0041; 
n
y = 0.0045.
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Table 13: Welfare over di¤erent time horizons
with, and without, debt consolidation under exible exchange rates
2 periods 4 periods 10 periods 20 periods 30 periods
with consolid.
without consolid.36
1:3482
(1:6247)
2:7976
(3:1786)
7:4448
(7:4451)
15:1411
(13:4043)
22:1486
(18:1768)
welfare gain/loss -0.0890 -0.0750 -0.00005 0.0969 0.1634
Notes: As in Table 12.
10 Figures
Figure 1: IRFs under debt consolidation with the optimal scal mix
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Notes: IRFs are in levels and converge to the reformed steady-state, while the
solid horizontal line indicates the point of departure (status-quo value).
36 In the case without debt consolidation, the optimal feedbacks are  = 1:3972; y = 0;  = 0:0002;
gl = 0:2515; 
c
l = 0:0011; 
k
l = 0:6417; 
n
l = 0:3298, 
g
y = 0:3572; 
c
y = 0:3132; 
k
y = 0:0169; 
n
y = 0:0001.
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